The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 65 | Number 1

Article 6

February 1998

The 1996 Conference of the Canadian Bioethics
Society: Reflections
Moira McQueen
James L. Walsh

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
McQueen, Moira and Walsh, James L. (1998) "The 1996 Conference of the Canadian Bioethics Society: Reflections," The Linacre
Quarterly: Vol. 65 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol65/iss1/6

The 1996 Conference of
the Canadian Bioethics Society:
Reflections
by

Moira McQueen, LL.B., Ph.D.
and
James L. Walsh, C.S.B., S.T.D.

Dr. McQueen is a Sessional Lecturer in Christian Elhics althe Faculty
a/Theology, University a/St. Michael's College, Toronto, with special
interests in medical and sexual ethics and the interdisciplinary aspects
of law, theological ethics and medicine.

There a/so, Fr. Walsh is Associate Professor of Christian Ethics,
teaching Fundamental Chris/ian Ethics and Medical Ethics.

In their introduction to Catholic Perspectives on Medkal
Morals, the editors, Pellegrino, Langan and Harvey, point out that until
recently Catholic medical morals had the field to itself. In the last
twenty·five years or so, however, biomedical ethics has become the
domain of secular philosophers. The current methodology is
characterized as strongly utilitarian, pragmatic and eclectic, and as more
attractive than theological ethics to a sec ular, pluralistic society. I The
writers are speaki ng about the situation in the United States, but they
could be speaking equally well about Canada.
The focus of this article is the absence at the conference of any
public reference to the transcendent in human experience and the
consequences of this for public debate. It is a personal reaction and
must, therefore, be subjective and reflect only a part of what was there
to be sampled. It is not concerned with the caliber of what, in some
cases, passed for philosophy or ethics. Indeed, the vast majority of the

46

Linacre Quarterly

participants seemed professionally sound and genuinely interested in
pursuing the truth . Neither is it a subtle attack on anyone's personal
beliefs or practices. This article intends to question the faith which
denies faith yet supplies its own faith answer, namely the faith which
asserts that there is no God. It intends also to explore the morality of
compromise. It is important to have dialogue with non-Christians in
the hope that practical solutions are in confonnity with Christian
morality even if the context is devoid of ultimate concern.
It is not at all the case that the Society is against religious
persons. The out going president is a Roman Catholic religious sister
and the 1996-7 president is a Roman Catholic also. There are several
Roman Catholics and practicing Christians of other denominations who
are very influentia1 in the organization. The question before us is how
Christians should be light to the pluralistic world ofbioethics. 2
Aspects of this question date from the dawn of Christianity and
have been part of its history ever since.) The 1970s saw a widespread
debate among Roman Catholic theologians about the specificity of
Christian ethics. How does faith influence morality? Are there
answers to moral dilemmas which are opaque to human reason without
the aid of faith? Is the work of faith restricted to intentiona1ity and
motivation alone? Is there a true possibility of conversation with nonChristians?
The Roman Catholic tradition is strong on the ability of human
reason unaided by faith to anive at right moral judgments. Presumably.
this refers to a potentia1 whose possibility for actualization depends on
many factors, both agent specific and cultural. Further, it has more
immediate reference to general attitudes than to specific judgments of
conscience. In a culture where spiritual values are appreciated and
where human persons are understood in their relationship to the
transcendent, human reason has a horizon of truth. Where Christian
anthropology is denied or disregarded, where pluralism in ethics is
lauded as a great value, where religious views are estimated as purely
subjective. idiosyncratic or ideological, then unaided human reason is
out of its depth.
What was very heartening at the conference was the strong
movement away from the medicalization of ethics (every ethical
problem is really a medical question) to the promotion of the dignity of
the human person to the core of all health care questions and as the
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essential element in the how and what of their answers. Immediately,
however, the question arises as to the adequacy of the notion of
personal dignity which is without any consideration of the religious
nature of the human person and his or her relationship with what
transcends human life, love and relationships. The concern is not that
a secular appreciation of the human person is short of a fuller
appreciation of the person which comes from revelation, as if religious
folk know an added dimension of the person which is already adequate
in secular thought. It is .that we are dealing with distortion, even though
this is not necessarily recognized by either group, believers or nonbelievers, especially when the groups genuinely want to work together

for the good of all.
"Dignity" is a fonnal concept which does not have content until
that content is spelled out. Until we know what is involved in the
concept "dignity of the human person", we do not know which actions
are demanded (by justice and by love) and which are excluded with
respect to any human person. The "death with dignity" slogan can
serve to make the point, where both sides on the assisted suicide debate
use the concept of dignity to promote or decry euthanasia. Other
examples of thi s were very evident at the conference. Tenns like
autonomy, dignity, futility, family, justice, the common good and
compassion were interpreted very differently by speakers. It is not too
difficult to see, for example, how a notion of the human person as the
measure of all things and as being in a relationship with other humans
according to a liberal individualistic model would necessarily support
the morality of assisted suicide.
Classically, theology is understood as faith seeking
understanding. When moral theology is defined as reason infonned by
faith, there has been a subtle change which can result, if we are not
careful, in a demotion of faith's role . The role of faith in our culture is
absolutely crucial. Without a unifying faith, and here we are speaking
about any faith which accepts the dependence of human beings on God
and their eternal destiny, concepts of what it means to be human in our
culture have become diverse and contradictory.
Would it not be possible to achieve a sufficient common ground
with a recovery of "habits of the heart" (virtues) without a religious
faith? It WOUld, if this were possible in our culture. The truth is that
virtues are acquired abilities and these require content too. Being
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loving and compassionate is not reducible to wann feelings, nor can
virtues be given common content through naked intuition or a moral
sense. But, it might be countered, are we not in agreement about
practical matters anyhow, even if our theoretical bases are different?
The fact is, often we are not. For example, we differ with respect to
allocation questions, the use of fetal tissue, abortion, euthanasia,
withdrawal of life support systems, confidentiality ... the list goes on.
But surely these questions are debated between religious bioethicists
themselves? True, but at least here there can be an appeal to a common
ground from which practical answers should flow. There is no
common ground between the various fOl1lls of atheistic philosophy and
religious belief.
What is the bioethicist to do who is committed to a religious
stance?
I) A first step would be to make one's faith stance known, and
known for what it is. It is not an individual preference like being a fan
a particular sports team, or being fond of bran muffins. It is a total
person-determining commitment which influences one's every moral
position.
2) Persons dedicated to religious faith should recognize that the
denial or disregard for the transcendent is a faith stance, too, and should
not be accorded the high ground it claims. Reli gious bioethicists
should not be cowed, somehow, into keeping faith truths out of the
conversation or feeling that what they have to say in this way is of no
importance to a dialogue between professionals. In the name of
friendship, humility or fear of elitism, neither should they be afraid of
their own specifically faith commitment to truth and its consequences
for a horizon of meaning and what flows from thi s.
3) Persons of religious faith should be aware that when religious
bioethicists and secular bioethicists talk together in a realm without
consideration of the transcendent, they are not necessarily, as is often
understood, conversing on common ground . For the person of faith,
there is an understanding that the human person is open to the
transcendent, even if that is not being discussed directly in the present
conversation. In the same conversation, the one without faith in the
transcendent has a different understanding of the human person.
4) It is important, for the good of people, that right decisions are
made in health care both at policy levels and in individual cases.
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Religious bioethicists should continue to search for the truth in
common with others, with those of similar beliefs and with those of
none. They should continue to influence others after the manner of
Pope John Paul U's encyclical. Evangelium Vitae, calling people beyond
their present understanding in accordance with their deepest and truest
appreciations (see pars. 2 and 30). A religious person's commitment to
letting his or her faith provide the horizon of truth for ethical judgment
need not be expressed in talk about God nor in specifically religious
language. 4
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